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SINGLE AsSET REAL EsTATE AND DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECTS: 
THE KARA HOMES MISTAKE 
MARSHALLE.TRACHT 
The Kara Homes decision held that various affiliates of Kara Homes, Inc., 
each of which owned a separate real estate project, were "single asset real estate" 
("SARE'') cases under the Bankruptcy Code's definition. According to the author 
of this article, the designation as single asset real estate substantially increased the 
difficulty faced by the debtors in maintaining their reorganization efforts, and 
has given lenders and their counsel a significant amount of comfort. However, 
the definition runs against the actual wording of the Bankruptcy Code, the 
intent underlying the SARE provisions, and the political winds. It should, and 
may well, be reversed in subsequent cases. 
I n the real estate downturn of the late 1980s and early 19905, bankruptcy posed a serious threat to commercial mortgage lenders, often hobbling their ability to effectively enforce their rights to the mortgaged property. 
This time around, however, changes in the lawl and in the structuring of 
transactions2 have significantly curtailed the problems lenders face in fore-
closing on many properties and the changed framework is entitled to a great 
deal of praise. However, in a 2007 case, In re Kara Homes, the court misin-
terpreted the definition of "single asset real estate," taking these protections 
a step too far by holding the separate project subsidiaries of a development 
Marshall E. Tracht is a Professor of Law and the Director of the Real Estate LL.M. 
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company to be single asset real estate companies. Unfortunately, a number of 
other courts have followed Kara Homes, and this faulty interpretation threat-
ens to become settled law, imposing an inappropriate and undue burden on 
many troubled development and construction projects.3 
In Kara Homes,4 the bankruptcy court held that various affiliates ofKara 
Homes, Inc., each of which owned a separate real estate project, were "single 
asset real estate" ("SARE") cases under the Bankruptcy Code's definition. As 
discussed herein, the designation as SARE substantially increased the diffi-
culty faced by the debtors in maintaining their reorganization efforts. Lend-
ers and their counsel have taken a significant amount of comfort from the 
decision (and following cases) - but it runs against the actual wording of the 
Code, the intent underlying the SARE provisions, and the political winds. It 
should, and may well, be reversed in subsequent cases. 
THE KARA HOMES CASE 
Kara Homes, Inc. is a residential developer in New Jersey, doing both sin-
gle family and condominium projects. It establishes separate entities (collec-
tively, "the Affiliates") to hold, develop and sell the real estate for each project, 
apparently using workers employed by Kara Homes and detailed out to the 
Affiliates as needed. In late 2006, Kara Homes and the Affiliates all filed for 
Chapter 11 protection. Given their interrelationships, the bankruptcy court 
ordered that the cases be jointly administered, but did not order substantive 
consolidation. On the bankruptcy petitions, the Affiliates were identified as 
single asset real estate entities. 
Shortly thereafter, the Affiliates filed complaints against the construction 
lenders on the various projects, seeking declaratory judgment that they were 
not actually single asset real estate entities. On cross motions for summary 
judgment, however, the court held that they were SARE entities, as defined in 
the Bankruptcy Code, and thus were subject to the special lender protections 
in Section 363(d)(3) of the Code. 
The debtors argued that they did not fall under the SARE definition 
because each Affiliate was actively engaged in a substantial business beyond 
operating the real property. Each had to acquire appropriate land, obtain site 
approvals, design homes or condominiums for the property, arrange for the 
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construction, and build common spaces, amenities and roadways.5 
The court rejected this argument. relying in large part on the test enunci-
ated in In re Philmont DelJ. Co.6 Philmont set out a four part test for deter-
mining whether a debtor fell within the SARE definition: 
Section 101(51B) enumerates four criteria which must exist before a 
bankruptcy case falls within the scope of Section 101(51B). First, real 
property constituting a single property or project, other than residential 
real property with fewer than 4 residential units, falls within the scope of 
sSection 10 1 (51 B). Second. that real property must generate substantial-
ly all of the income of the debtor. Third, the debtor must not be involved 
in any substantial business other than the operation of its real property 
and the activities incidental thereto. Fourth, the debtor's aggregate non-
contingent liquidated secured debt must be less than $4,000,000.7 
Following this formulation, the Kara decision noted that each Affiliate 
owned a single property or project. Second, the court reasoned, the real 
property generated substantially all of each Affiliate's income because their 
only source of income would be sale of the completed residences. The "true 
point of contention," the court wrote, was whether the debtors' were engaged 
in any substantial business other than the "operation of its real property and 
activities incidental thereto."8 (The fourth Philmont requirement, having se-
cured debt less than $4 million, was removed from the definition of SARE by 
Congress in 2005.) 
The court's conclusion was that the Affiliates fall within this third prong 
as well: 
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The Affiliated Debtors are in the business of constructing and selling 
single family homes on the parcels of real estate owned by the Affiliated 
Debtors. In order to build and sell homes, it is often necessary to ac-
quire the land on which to build the homes, and plan the community in 
which they lie; likewise, it is necessary to market those homes for sale and 
maintain the properties. All of the activities identified by the Debtors as 
reflective of "business operations" are merely incidental to the Affiliated 
Debtors efforts to sell these homes or condominium units and do not 
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constitute substantial business .... Thus, the Court finds that the Affili-
ated Debtors fall within the definition of "single asset real estate" debtors 
and, as such, 11 USC § 362(d)(3) applies.9 
The Kara court misapplied the test in Philmont, which did not deal with 
entities that were developing real property. There were two different classes 
of debtors in Philmont. Philmont Development owned partnership interests 
in three other partnerships, as well as two undeveloped building lots. The 
court found that Philmont Development was not SARE because its "purpose 
is not the operation of real property nor is rental income its direct source 
of income."10 The limited partnerships in which Philmont Development 
had ownership interests were SARE, however, because the partnerships each 
owned and managed a series of semi-detached housing. The court deter-
mined that while the semi-detached housing might not have been "single 
property," it fell within the category of a "single project" for each partnership. 
Notably, none of the partnerships in Philmont were involved in planning, 
developing, or building any of the properties. Philmont Development would 
develop the project, which the partnership would then purchase and manage. 
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE'S SARE PROVISIONS 
Congress originally adopted the added lender protections for SARE 
bankruptcy cases in 1994, at the urging of lenders who felt that, in the real 
estate downturn of the late 1980s, many borrowers with no real prospect for 
reorganization had filed for bankruptcy simply to delay foreclosure and hope 
for an upturn in the market. The arguments for limiting bankruptcy access 
for single asset real estate entities were well summarized in the Bankruptcy 
Review Commission's 1997 Single Asset Proposals: 
SARE cases often serve few recognized goals of Chapter 11. First, con-
firmation of a plan provides minimal benefit to unsecured creditors. 
Unsecured trade debt is typically paid after the property is foreclosed, 
either by the purchaser, who wants to maintain the same services to the 
property, or by the general partners of the debtor, who remain liable for 
partnership debts. Second, the bankruptcy does not serve the purpose 
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of eliminating the desrrucrive race among unsecured creditors. There is 
typically only one significanr asscr, rhe real property, and that is generally 
fully encumbered by the firsr mortgage. Third, the debtor often has no 
equity in the property (0 preservc. In such cases, the debtor is not trying 
to preserve a present economic interest, but rather is attempting to retain 
the property in the hope thar irs value will increase in the future. Fourth, 
loss of jobs and going-concern value are generally not at stake in single-
asset real estate cases. In the usual case, if a debtor loses the property to 
a new owner, the new owner operates the property in the same general 
manner as the debtor, rhus preserving the same number of jobs and eco-
nomic activity in the community.ll 
The definition of single asset debtors is provided in Section 101 (51 B) of 
the Bankruptcy Code: 
[t]he term "single asset real estate" means real property constituting a 
single property or project, other than residential real property with fewer 
than 4 residential units, which generates substantially all of the gross in-
come of a debtor who is not a family farmer and on which no substantial 
business is being conducted by a debtor other than the business of oper-
ating the real property and activities incidental. 
The actual protection for lenders in SARE cases is contained in 11 V.S.c. 
§ 362(d)(3), under which a single asset real estate debtor must, within 90 
days of the bankruptcy filing (extendable by the court), either file a plan of 
reorganization that has a reasonable prospect of confirmation or begin mak-
ing interest payments to the mortgagee calculated at the nondefault rate of 
interest. 12 
The mechanics of the rule fit the underlying problem well. Many single 
asset debtors have no real prospect of reorganization. However, the Chap-
ter 11 creates a delay that may hurt the creditor while allowing the debtor 
to speculate on an improvement in the real estate market (encouraging as 
much delay as possible). The proceeding may also allow the debtor to apply 
rents that have been pledged to the lender as additional security, toward its 
bankruptcy costs so that, in essence, the lender is paying for the debtor's op-
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position to its attempt to enforce its mortgage. Section 362(d)(3) requires 
that, within 90 days, the debtor must either prove that it has a feasible reor-
ganization plan in prospect or else protect the lender from the harm of delay 
by paying interest on the debt. 
The short deadline makes sense because the reorganization plan for a 
SARE debtor is a relatively simple affair: with no significant creditors other 
than the mortgagee and no operations to restructure, there are no complex 
business questions to resolve or difficult multiparty negotiations to work 
through. A SARE plan generally amounts to either speculation that future 
financing or a sale may appear or cramdown of the mortgage debt. Either of 
these plans is fairly straightforward, so there is much less need than in other 
cases for a lengthy period in which to develop, negotiate, draft, and propose 
a reorganization plan. 
If the plan is not filed before the deadline, the debtor must begin paying 
interest to the mortgagee. In most cases, the real estate will not be generating 
sufficient income to cover its expenses and pay the interest - otherwise the 
debtor would not have defaulted in the first place. Thus, Section 362(d)(3) 
basically ensures that if a reorganization plan is not promptly proposed, the en-
tire net operating income from the property will be paid to the lender. Further, 
the debtor's equity holders will most likely have to contribute capital simply in 
order to make the interest payments, providing another important disincentive 
to filing merely to delay foreclosure or to maintain a hopeless case. 
THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
Whether the SARE provisions apply to development projects is a matter 
of statutory interpretation. Unfortunately, the Code's definition of single as-
set real estate is ambiguous. Section 101 (51 B) defines SARE as "real property 
... which generates substantially all of the gross income of a debtor ... and on 
which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor other than the 
business of operating the real property and activities incidental." 
A critical phrase that sheds light on the scope of this provision is "the 
business of operating the real estate." In Kara Homes, the court concluded 
that the Affiliates were SARE entities because all of their income would come 
from selling the properties, once developed; but selling real estate is not the 
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same as "operating" it. One talks about "operating" existing real estate, like a 
shopping center or office building, but the process of developing or construct-
ing a new project is not typically referred to as "operating the real estate," nor 
is selling the developed real estate considered "operating" it. One would 
certainly not confuse "operating" a farm, a factory, or a car with building and 
selling it. Thus, the process of development or construction is a "substantial 
business" other than "operating the real estate." 
The legislative history, sparse though it is, supports this reading. The 
phrase "real property on which no business is being conducted by the debtor 
other than the business of operating the real property and activities incidental 
thereto" dates from a Senate draft of the relief from stay provisions of Sec-
tion 362(d) for the 1978 Bankruptcy CodeY The language was omitted 
before passage, only to reappear in the 1994 amendments. However, as was 
explained when the language was first introduced, the phrase was intended 
to: 
reach the single asset apartment type cases which involve primarily tax 
shelter investments and for which the bankruptcy laws have provided a 
too-facile method to relay [sic] conditions, but not the operating shop-
ping center or hotel cases where attempts at reorganization should be 
permitted. 14 
Thus, it was not seen as an all encompassing definition, but one that would 
capture passive investment vehicles.15 This emerges, as well, in Section 363( d) 
(3), which provides that the rents from the property may be used to make 
payments to the creditor to avoid the lifting of the stay - development proj-
ects generally have no rents. 
Many courts have commented that in passing the SARE amendments 
in 1994, Congress was aware of the meaning of the phrase "singe asset real 
estate" from prior case law, and thus the statutory definition should be read 
with those prior cases in mind. 16 Prior to the SARE amendments, a principal 
attack on single asset real estate cases was an assertion that the case was filed 
in "bad faith," and that there was thus "cause" for the judge to dismiss the 
caseY While the bad faith argument was unsatisfactory to lenders, because 
it depends on the specific facts and circumstances of every case and because 
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the standards are vague and inconsistently applied, over time it became a use-
ful tool for sorting our those single asset cases that legitimately belonged in 
Chapter 11 and those that were abusing the bankruptcy process. 
A review of the single asset "bad faith" case law from 1993 and earlier 
discloses scores of cases of which the drafters of the 1994 amendments would 
have been aware, very few of which appear to have involved ongoing con-
struction or development - and those few support the view that these types 
of projects are not the inherently abusive situations that Congress was seeking 
to addressY 
ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE ACTIVITIES 
For example, in One Fourth Street,19 the debtor had purchased a 10 story 
office building and borrowed funds to renovate it. Although the renovations 
were finished, leasing was slower than expected and the debtor defaulted, 
subsequently filing for bankruptcy. The court refused to dismiss the case as a 
bad faith filing, distinguishing the renovation situation from a typical single 
asset case: 
[T]he Debtor operates a business in the conventional sense of the word. 
The business, which is an ongoing concern, consists of the ownership, lease 
and management of the office building owned by the Debtor. The build-
ing project was undertaken as a rehabilitation and development project. 
The loan from Florida Federal involved an acquisition and development 
objective. Neither the Debtor nor Florida Federal anticipated any cash 
throwoff for the first four to five years of the project. Unfortunately for all 
parties involved, the Debtor's timetable for profitability was adversely af-
fected by a softening office rental market. However, the Debtor has made 
significant progress in leasing up its space despite market conditions.20 
The court recognized the inherent difference between renovating and 
re-leasing a building and simply owning and managing the property. The 
former is an ongoing active business, justifying an opportunity to reorganize, 
while the latter is essentially a passive investment.21 
The motion to dismiss a bad faith filing was granted in In re Rad Proper-
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ties,22 where the debtor had been trying to develop single family lots for sale. 
It filed for bankruptcy on the eye of foreclosure, having been unable to com-
plete development even after full funding of the development loan. It had 
also been largely unsuccessful in selling the lots it had completed. The court 
held that the filing was in bad flith for a combination of reasons. First, there 
was no development operation to rehabilitate, because the development com-
pany consisted solely of one person. ~3 Second, the debtor filed the day before 
summary judgment would have been entered against it in a state foreclosure 
action, "strong evidence," the court said, that the debtor filed "merely to delay 
or frustrate the legitimate efforts of its secured creditors."24 Third, the debtor 
had no realistic chance of reorganizing successfully.25 Not surprisingly, the 
finding that there was no hope for reorganization and that the filing was 
merely to delay and frustrate the mortgagees led to a "bad faith" dismissal.26 
We could expect the same result today in a construction or development 
case where the loan had been fully funded and the project was incomplete 
and unsalvageable. It does not follow, of course, that Congress intended the 
debtor to be subject to the requirements of Section 363(d)(3). 
The courts have generally recognized the distinction between active and 
passive holdings in determining SARE status. In the recent Fifth Circuit de-
cision in In re Scotia, the court quoted with approval the following language 
from a district court case: 
In order to be single asset real estate, the revenues received by the owner 
must be passive in nature; the owner must not be conducting any ac-
tive business, other than merely operating the real property and activities 
incidental thereto. Under the prior jurisprudence, those passive types of 
activities are the mere receipt of rent and truly incidental activities such 
as arranging for maintenance or perhaps some marketing activity, or ... 
mowing the grass and waiting for the market to turn.27 
A debtor engaged in developing a property is not engaged in "the mere 
receipt of rent and truly incidental activities." The single asset paradigm just 
does not fit. 
Bankruptcy experts who have considered single asset real estate cases have 
typically ignored projects under development or in construction because they 
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do not generally raise the same concerns as passive investment vehicles. Con-
sider, for example, this description of the "paradigm of the single asset case" 
1. The debtor is an investment vehicle, usually a partnership, but occasionally 
a corporation, that was formed for the purpose of holding the single asset 
as an investment, rather than to operate an ongoing business. As such, the 
demise of the debtor will not mean that a business fails and that employees 
lose their jobs, but rather that the particular owners of the partnership or 
corporation will lose their equity as creditors take over the asset. 
2. The asset owned by the debtor is almost always real estate. The real estate 
is generally income producing, given the obvious and generally insur-
mountable difficulties of reorganizing a nonincome-producing asset. 
3. The immediate cause of the filing of the case is usually a default in one 
or more secured obligations. Unsecured obligations, typically trade debt 
arising from the operation of the single asset, are much less significant 
and generally are a small fraction of the debtor's total obligations. The 
case usually centers around a dispute with one or more secured creditors, 
because unsecured creditors (and in some cases, junior secured creditors) 
have little or no hope of recovering on their claims absent a successful 
reorganization. 
4. The debtor's default in its secured obligations is generally the result of a 
recession or other cause that leads to a reduction in occupancy and rentals, 
leaving the debtor with too little cash flow to service its secured debt.28 
Similarly, the Bankruptcy Review Commission (as prominent a gather-
ing of bankruptcy experts as you will find) spent 66 pages on the issues raised 
by single asset real estate and proposals for further reforms to the SARE pro-
visions. It gave examples of difficult situations and whether they should fit 
under the definition;29 but the report does not contain even one word about 
development projects or properties under construction, and every SARE is 
about a completed and operating asset (office building, factory, strip shop-
ping center, regional shopping mall). 
Kara seems to draw a line between real estate businesses and companies 
that use real estate in some other line of business. However, the distinction 
267 
THE BANKING LAW JOURNAL 
in the Code is actually between companies that do nothing but "operate real 
estate," and active businesses,3o the same distinction drawn in One Fourth 
Street. The value of the former is largely inherent in the asset, and little or no 
value is lost through foreclosure, so the costs and delay of Chapter 11 serve no 
purpose. An active development or construction project, however, requires 
Chapter 11 to preserve going concern value for the benefit of all creditors and 
other stakeholders. 
Note that the requirements of Section 362(d)O) do not make sense in 
the development or construction context. The SARE amendments have ad-
dressed lender complaints about unjustified bankruptcy cases. However, 
Congress did not bar SARE entities from filing for bankruptcy. It provided 
that a lender would be entitled to relief from the automatic stay, to proceed 
with state foreclosure, if a SARE debtor did not promptly either file a realistic 
plan or commence interest payments. This ~as a critical victory for lenders, 
which othetwise might spend months or years without receiving payments on 
the debt despite the fact that the debtor was collecting rents from the prop-
erty - and which might even see the rents used to finance the bankruptcy 
case and reorganization efforts it opposes.3! 
This protection, which prevents diversion of the rents, makes sense for 
operating properties. However, if applied to development projects, the pay-
ment requirement is an instant death knell for the bankruptcy case. The 
debtor would find itself required to make interest payments despite the fact 
that the project does not yet have any income - a requirement that will be 
impossible for almost any development project to meet. This is recognized 
in the very structure of most development and construction loans, which do 
not require any loan payments until the project is finished or provide for the 
lender to fund the payments to itself through an interest reserve set up from 
the construction loan funds. It would be odd for the bankruptcy requirement 
for a debtor seeking to reorganize to impose harsher payment terms than the 
loan documents themselves. 
THE POLICY ARGUMENTS 
The fundamental objection to single asset Chapter 11 filings is that there 
is no bankruptcy justification for the proceeding - the case does not involve 
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preserving or enhancing going concern value, or preserving jobs, or maximiz-
ing the recovery for creditors. Rather, it is a simple battle between the owner 
and the mortgage lender for rights to an asset of fixed value. Whoever owns 
the property, space will be leased, rent will be collected, and expenses will be 
paid. There is little if any value in the management of the asset (a service that 
is easily purchased, in any case); the value is in the ownership of the asset. This 
is true if the property is a shopping center, office building, apartment com-
plex, warehouse, or even undeveloped land. In such a circumstance, there is 
no justification for delaying the lender's right to foreclose or for incurring the 
costs of a bankruptcy proceeding. 
The same cannot, however, be said of a real estate development project. 
In a development project or building construction the developer may bring 
critical skills and personal, professional and contractual relationships to the 
project. Loss of the developer is likely to mean delays, cost overruns, and the 
loss of real economic value as a new manager takes over a complex process of 
interrelated activities. This loss of economic value means that there is likely 
to be less available to pay creditors, as well as a greater potential liability for 
any guarantors. These are the precisely the types of losses that bankruptcy is 
designed to prevent. 
Moreover, many development projects are not simple two party dispures, 
as true single asset cases usually are. A development project may involve 
contracts with numerous parties to provide takeout financing, architectural 
services and construction management, construction materials and labor, 
leasing and brokerage services. It may include obligations to the local gov-
ernment for infrastructure development. It will often involve the rights of 
tenants who have signed leases for the space once it is developed or buy-
ers who have signed purchase agreements. Failure of the development may 
mean large losses not just for the developer and lender, but also for numerous 
suppliers and contractors whose rights may need to be protected through a 
reorganization proceeding.32 
In many cases, a development or construction loan made to the debtor 
will have been guaranteed by the individual(s) or development company be-
hind the project. This means that the resolution of the single asset case is 
inseparable from the reorganization of the developer itself. We see precisely 
this reasoning in the recent ruling in General Growth Properties. 33 General 
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Growth is one of the nation's largest real estate firms, developing and op-
erating major shopping centers around the United States. The bankruptcy 
proceeding included 388 related entities that had filed, many of which had 
been established to own and operate a specific project. While the case did not 
discuss whether these entities were SARE, the court denied creditors' motions 
to dismiss the filings by solvent subsidiaries as "bad faith" by looking to the 
interests of the corporate group as a whole.34 
A similar analysis in Kara Homes would have recognized that Kara Homes 
(the developer) and the Affiliates are part of a business operation that must be 
considered as a whole. While the lenders wanted to count on a "bankruptcy 
remote" structure to insulate themselves from the cost and delay of a reorga-
nization proceeding, removing the individual projects causes the piecemeal 
dismemberment of an operating business enterprise. Neither the Affiliates 
nor Kara Homes would likely be worth as mllch without the others. And in 
all probability, the lenders advanced their funds in reliance on Kara Homes' 
repuration and overall financial strength, in addition to the specific collateral, 
expecting that Kara Homes would ensure the successful development and the 
ultimate sales or refinancings that would pay them back. 
Considering the interest of the overall enterprise, rather than looking at 
each debtor in isolation, is consistent with other examinations of the SARE 
provisions and their purposes. The Bankruptcy Review Commission, for 
example, stated that 
[w]hether the debtor uses real property in an active business should be 
viewed in terms of economic substance rather than the form of owner-
ship. Thus, where a debtor conducting an active business holds title to 
the real property used in that business through a separate entity, the en-
tity holding the real property should not be considered a SARE debtor.35 
While the authors of the Commission report do not appear to have been 
thinking about a development company (as noted previously, the report 
seemed to assume, sub silentio, that all SARE cases involve already completed 
properties), the reasoning applies precisely to a case like Kara Homes. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Kara Homes decision is troubling because it places form above sub-
stance, allowing creditors to dismember an ongoing real estate development 
business in a piecemeal fashion - exactly what bankruptcy is designed to 
prevent. This is not what Congress intended when it provided extra protec-
tions for mortgagees whose debtors were solely engaged in "operating the real 
estate." We can see that not only from the language, but from the very nature 
of the relief provided - relief that makes sense for debtors holding operating 
properties, but not for debtors whose properties are under construction or 
development. 
Recognizing that development projects do not fall within the definition 
of SARE does not leave the lender without protections. It can seek to have 
the case dismissed as having been filed in bad faith, or to have the automatic 
stay lifted under Section 362(d)(2) because the debtor lacks equity and has 
no reasonable prospect for reorganization, if those things are true. If they are 
not true, it is still entitled to adequate protection of its security interests and 
to a powerful role in the reorganization process. On the other side, however, 
if the debtor does have the prospect of successfully reorganizing the project 
by obtaining financing and completing development or construction, for the 
benefit all the involved parties, it will have its opportunity to do so without 
the unduly short deadline or unrealistic payment obligations imposed by Sec-
tion 362(d)(3). 
NOTES· 
1 Primarily the passage of the single asset real estate provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S. C. §§ 101(51B), 362(d)(3), discussed below. 
2 There are two primary changes in structuring that have had a significant impact. 
The first is the move to using "bankruptcy remote" entities to hold the real estate. 
See generally Michael D. Fielding, Preventing Voluntary and Involuntary Bankruptcy 
Petitions by Limited Liability Companies, 18 Bankr. Dev. ]. 51 (2001); Matter of 
GlobalShip Systems, LLe, 392 B.R. 193 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) (involuntary case 
dismissed as having been filed in bad faith in part because petition was an attempt 
to avoid LLC provisions designed to allow creditor to block a bankruptcy filing); but 
see In re General Growth Properties, 409 B.R. 43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (declining 
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to dismiss cases as bad faith filings despite the fact that, on the eve of filing for 
bankruptcy, debtor LLCs replaced "independent managers" which, under the 
Operating Agreements, were required to "consider only the interests of the Company, 
including its respective creditors" in voting on any proposal to file for bankruptcy). 
The second is the widespread adoption of nonrecourse carveouts and springing 
guaranties. See generally John C. Murray, Exploding and Springing Guaranties, in 
MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 2009 (SR001 ALI-ABA 1321) (2009); Marshall 
E. Tracht, Will Exploding Guaranties Bomb?, 117 Bank. L.J. 129 (2000). 
3 Courts following Kara Homes include: In re MTM Realty Trust, 2009 WL 
612147 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2009); In re Vtzrgas Realty Enterp. Inc., 2009 WL 292958 
(Bankr.S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re web MTN, LLC, 207 WL 2746894 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
2007); In re ACA Real Estate LLc' 2008 WL 4899024 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. 2008); In 
re Triumph Inv. Group, Inc., 2009 WL 2916986 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2009). 
4 In re Kara Homes, Inc., 363 B.R. 399 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007). 
sId. at 402-03. 
6 In re Philmont Dev. Co., 181 B.R. 220 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995). 
7 Id. at 223. 
8 363 B.R. at 405. 
9 !d. at 406. 
10 181 B.R. at 223 fn 1. 
11 See National Bankruptcy Review Comm'n, National Bankruptcy Review 
Commission Report, Ch. 2: Business Bankruptcy, Single Asset Proposals (Oct. 20, 
1997) at 673 ("BRC Report"). 
12 Section 362(d)(3) reads: 
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall 
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by 
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